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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellants Barbara Walters and Judith Kromenhoek 
filed these civil rights actions under the Fair Housing Act.  
Walters and Kromenhoek sought accommodations for their 
disabilities in the form of emotional support animals, which 
were not permitted under the rules of their condominium 
association.  They allege violations of their right to a 
reasonable accommodation of their disabilities, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(B), and interference with the exercise of their 
fair housing rights, 42 U.S.C. § 3617.  They also allege 
supplemental territorial claims.   
 
 Among other issues, these cases raise the question 
whether a Fair Housing Act claim survives the death of a 
party.  We hold that the District Court improperly answered 
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this question by applying a limited gap-filler statute, 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(a), and, in turn, territorial law.  We 
conclude that the survival of claims under the Fair Housing 
Act is not governed by Section 1988(a), but rather by federal 
common law, under which a Fair Housing Act claim survives 
the death of a party.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment against Walters’ 
executrix.   
 
 On the merits of the summary judgment motions, we 
will reverse in part and vacate in part.  We will remand to the 
District Court with instructions to consider whether to permit 
substitution for two deceased Appellees.  
 
I1 
 
 Appellants Walters and Kromenhoek suffered from 
disabilities, for which each was prescribed an emotional 
support animal.  Each woman obtained a dog.  This violated 
the “no dogs” rule of their condominium association, Cowpet 
Bay West.  Cowpet’s “no dogs” rule provided that “Dogs and 
farm animals are prohibited, and owners will be fined as 
specified by the Board of Directors.”  App. 104.  The rule had 
no exceptions and Cowpet had no policy regarding assistive 
                                              
 1  In our recitation of the facts, we consider as 
affidavits Walters and Kromenhoek’s sworn verified 
complaints, to the extent that they are based upon personal 
knowledge and set out facts that would be admissible in 
evidence.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); see also Reese v. 
Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating verified 
complaint as affidavit for summary judgment purposes). 
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animals, such as emotional support animals.2  The “no dogs” 
rule was enforced by the Cowpet Board of Directors, which 
has the authority to enforce the Cowpet “Rules and 
Regulations with monetary fines and other sanctions . . . .”  
App. 100.   
 
 Walters and Kromenhoek each attempted to request an 
accommodation for an emotional support animal by filing 
paperwork with Cowpet’s office manager, Louanne 
Schechter.  The paperwork included a doctor’s letter 
prescribing an emotional support animal, and a dog 
certification.  Each certification stated that the dog was 
“prescribed and deemed necessary to assist . . . the confirmed 
disabled handler” and that “property managers and 
                                              
 2  We use the term “emotional support animal” 
colloquially to refer to an animal that assists a person with a 
disability-related need for emotional support.  This is not a 
term of art under the Fair Housing Act.  See generally Pet 
Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 
73 Fed. Reg. 63834, 63834-36 (Oct. 27, 2008) (discussing the 
role of assistive animals, but noting that HUD regulations do 
not provide a specific definition).   
 
 What we are not referring to is a “service animal” 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  See 28 
C.F.R. § 35.104 (2016) (“Service animal means any dog that 
is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the 
benefit of an individual with a disability . . . . [T]he provision 
of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship 
do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this 
definition.”).  We use the phrases “service animal” and 
“service dog” only when quoting the parties directly. 
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landlords are required to make reasonable accommodation” 
under the Fair Housing Act.  App. 1304, 2231.  Walters 
submitted her paperwork in February 2011 and Kromenhoek 
in July 2011.  Cowpet took no action at the time.   
 
 The presence of dogs at Cowpet drew the ire of some 
residents.  One resident, Appellee Lance Talkington, fanned 
the flames by writing about dogs at Cowpet on his blog about 
the community.  In October 2011, Talkington wrote on his 
blog that “Barbara[] [Walters] has a dog and claims to have 
‘papers’ that allow her to have it.”  App. 1904.  He also wrote 
that he had asked the office manager “whether the office has 
Barbara[] [Walters’] paperwork in their files and whether 
monetary fines have been assessed if not,” but had not 
received an answer.  Id.   
 
 In response to this blog post, Appellee Alfred Felice 
posted the first of many inflammatory comments on 
Talkington’s blog.3  Felice wrote that dog owners might be 
“happier in another community rather than ostracized at 
[Cowpet], which would be another fine recourse, besides a 
significant $$ fine, with progressive amounts.”  App. 1905.   
 
 Walters, having been named by Talkington, responded 
on the blog.  She wrote that “[s]ince you so tactfully used my 
name in this blog, I am required to defend myself, not as a 
‘violator’ of any laws, but a person with a disability . . . .”  
App. 1906.  Walters also wrote that she was “mortified, that 
my personal business has been laid out over the internet 
without my permission or forewarning.”  App. 1912.  Felice 
                                              
 3  Neither Talkington nor Felice were on the Cowpet 
Board.  Walters was a Board member. 
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replied that someone who needed an emotional support dog 
“might go off his/her gourd without the pet at his/her side” in 
a “violent reaction.  We don’t even know we need 
protection![]  Bad Law![]”  App. 1906-07.  Talkington also 
commented that Walters “has a pet and should be fined.”  
App. 1910. 
 
 There followed a flurry of emails among the Cowpet 
Board, Walters and Kromenhoek.  On October 27, 2011, 
Walters emailed the members of the Board that “[m]y 
paperwork is on file in the office, but my medical information 
is no ones [sic] business and since this board has a history of 
violating confidentiality, how the hell can I trust any one of 
you to keep their mouth shut.  Am I going to find my 
information on Lance[] [Talkington’s] blog again?”  
App. 492.   
 
 On October 28, 2011, the Board president, Appellee 
Max Harcourt, notified Walters and Kromenhoek by email 
that they were in violation of the “no dogs” rule.  Harcourt 
wrote that the office manager “tells me that both you have 
‘papers in the office’ regarding service dogs; however you 
have not applied for an exception to the rule.”  App. 495.  
Harcourt gave Walters and Kromenhoek ten days to submit a 
request to the Board or be fined.  Harcourt copied his email to 
Talkington, who posted it on his blog. 
 
 The same day, Walters emailed the Board that “I am in 
possession of a service dog, and under the disabilities act set 
forth in the Fair Housing Amendment . . . I qualify to keep [a] 
service animal even when policy explicitly prohibits pets. 
. . . If any medical information is disclosed to Anderson, 
Talkington or any one [sic] else, that will be taken as 
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violation of privacy, and will be dealt with accordingly.”  
App. 581.   
 
 Kromenhoek also emailed Harcourt, although the copy 
of the email in the record is undated.  Like Walters, 
Kromenhoek wrote that she had “filed the necessary 
paperwork in the office and according to the Disabilities Act 
set forth in the Fair Housing Amendment . . . I qualify to keep 
a service animal even when policy explicitly prohibits pets.”  
App. 583.  She further wrote that she trusted the office 
manager with her medical information, but not the Board “as 
you have proved time and again that you cannot be 
trusted. . . . This is not a request for you to consider but this is 
informing you that I have a service dog and I am not in any 
violation.”  Id.  Kromenhoek wrote that she would “disclose 
my history and paperwork [to Harcourt] provided you sign a 
confidentiality agreement with a monetary penalty for 
disclosure . . . .”  App. 584.  Kromenhoek avers that she 
personally spoke to Harcourt and “invited him” to review her 
paperwork and to sign a confidentiality agreement, which he 
refused to sign.  App. 110.   
 
 Significantly, the parties dispute how the Board 
responded.  According to Walters and Kromenhoek, Harcourt 
did review their paperwork in the Cowpet office.  They point 
to the affidavit of the office manager, Schechter, who avers 
that Harcourt “came to the office and reviewed the 
documents . . . .”  App. 263, 349.  Schechter further avers that 
Harcourt “also sent his ‘representative’ Bill Canefield, 
another Board member to review the documents.”  App. 263-
64, 349-50.   
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 Appellees deny that the Board reviewed the paperwork 
on file in the Cowpet office.  They rely on the affidavit of 
Board treasurer, Sharon Koehler, who avers that the Board 
“neither reviewed nor discussed the content of [Walters and 
Kromenhoek]’s medical verification and accommodation 
request, until March 2012, when Plaintiff submitted same to 
then president, Ed Wardwell.”  App. 526, 612.  There is no 
testimony from Harcourt, who died while the case was 
pending in the District Court.   
 
 The Board did not grant an accommodation to Walters 
or Kromenhoek in the fall of 2011.  To the contrary, at a 
January 2012 Board meeting, Appellee Vincent Verdiramo 
moved to impose fines on dog owners.  The Board voted to 
fine Walters and Kromenhoek for violating the “no dogs” 
rule.  The fine was fifty dollars per day.  These fines were 
held in abeyance, pending legal advice.4   
 
 On Talkington’s blog, Felice and Talkington continued 
to denigrate dog owners at Cowpet.  For example, in 
November 2011, Felice wrote “If you can’t remove the guilty, 
                                              
 4  Shortly after Cowpet imposed fines on them, 
Walters and Kromenhoek each filed a complaint with the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”).  HUD subsequently reviewed the 
merits of their reasonable accommodation claims against 
Cowpet and dismissed them for lack of “reasonable cause.”  
42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(3).  This ruling does not foreclose a 
private civil action.  42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(2); see also 
Turner v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 449 F.3d 
536, 540 (3d Cir. 2006).  Talkington posted the HUD 
complaints on his blog. 
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you can certainly ostracize them.”  App. 1920.  In December 
2011, Talkington wrote a blog post naming and labeling 
Walters and Kromenhoek as “known violators” and their 
emotional support animals as “illegal neighborhood puppy 
dogs.”  App. 1924.  Talkington also reported that a neighbor 
heard one dog barking and added, sarcastically, that “trained 
service dogs are specifically trained to not bark unless the 
owner is in imminent danger.  Maybe one of the pups pooped 
in the owner’s unit and was warning the owner to watch out?”  
App. 1924.   
 
 Talkington subsequently wrote a blog post stating that 
Walters and Kromenhoek have “certified” emotional support 
dogs, but that such certifications are issued without 
“verify[ing] either the animal’s credentials or the purported 
disability.”  App. 1930.  Talkington later posted that “[t]hese 
r[i]diculous puppy dog diplomas from the paper mills are out 
of line.”  App. 1934.  Talkington wrote that the “diploma 
mill” would accept “stress” as “a disability that qualifies for 
their certification” without any doctor confirmation.  App. 
1935.  Felice echoed this sentiment in belligerent terms.  He 
wrote: “PAY a few $’s on the internet and ‘PRESTO’ a 
service dog is born . . . I could ‘certify’ my ceramic toy with 
THAT process.”  App. 1935.   
 
 Later that winter, Talkington wrote on his blog that 
Cowpet should “go on the offensive and lawyer up to pursue 
an action against owners who are noncompliant with the 
policy on service dogs. . . . This is the type of action where 
each party will bear their own legal costs regardless of the 
outcome, so each party will have to decide how badly they 
want to pursue it.”  App. 1938.  Felice then posted a 
comment, describing Walters and Kromenhoek as 
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“miscreants.”  App. 1939.  Felice wrote that “failure to 
comply [with the no dogs rule] must lead to liens and even 
foreclosure, if needed, for compliance to be effective.  These 
ungracious owners are totally selfish, spoiled, brats, willing to 
flaunt their illegality in every one[’]s face . . . .  Such gall and 
nerve require full responce [sic], with ostracizing the 
offenders in every manner at our disposal![]  Isolate them 
completely to their little ‘dog patch’ on the beach and ignore 
them at every venue or occasion![]”  Id.  Talkington followed 
up by writing that Walters and Kromenhoek are “playground 
bullie[s]” attempting to “hang onto their puppies.”  App. 
1940.  He wrote that “it is time for the association to go on 
the offensive and file suit in a court of law to force the issue.  
When these ladies have to start spending their own cash 
. . . the rubber will meet the road on how far everyone is 
willing to go on this issue.”  App. 1940-41.   
 
 The ferment finally came to a close after Harcourt 
completed his term as President of the Cowpet Board and was 
succeeded by a new President, Ed Wardwell.  In March 2012, 
Walters and Kromenhoek submitted to Wardwell formal 
requests for accommodation.  In April 2012, the Board 
granted the requests and waived the accrued fines.  
 
 Walters and Kromenhoek, nevertheless, filed these 
civil rights cases under the Fair Housing Act.  They raised 
two federal claims: (1) that Cowpet denied their reasonable 
requests for accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(B) and (2) that Cowpet and three individual 
Appellees (Talkington, Felice and Harcourt) interfered with 
the exercise of their fair housing rights in violation of 
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42 U.S.C. § 3617.  Walters and Kromenhoek also asserted 
supplemental territorial law claims against all Appellees.5 
 
 Tragically, Walters committed suicide while her case 
was pending in the District Court.6  Appellees moved for 
summary judgment.  The District Court dismissed Walters’ 
Fair Housing Act claims entirely due to her death.  As to 
Kromenhoek, the District Court denied her Fair Housing Act 
claims on the merits.  The District Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the territorial claims in both 
cases because no federal claims remained.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3).   
 
 Walters and Kromenhoek now appeal the District 
Court’s dismissal of their claims at summary judgment.  In 
addition, Walters and Kromenhoek have filed motions to 
substitute representatives for Appellees Felice and Harcourt, 
who died while these cases were pending in the District 
Court.7   
                                              
 5  Walters and Kromenhoek have conceded their 
claims against the Board.  They have also conceded 
previously-raised ADA claims. 
  
 6  We granted substitution of Liana Walters Revock as 
personal representative under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 43(a).  We refer to Walters by name for ease of 
reference.  
 7  We refer to Felice and Harcourt by name for ease of 
reference.  On appeal, former counsel for Felice purports to 
represent Felice and explains that he is being paid by Felice’s 
insurer.  Harcourt is purportedly represented by counsel for 
Cowpet, Cockayne and Verdiramo.  As is consistent with our 
14 
 
 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
The existence and scope of our jurisdiction are 
disputed issues because, some Appellees contend, Walters 
and Kromenhoek filed their notices of appeal prematurely.  
However, to the extent that the initial judgment Walters and 
Kromenhoek appealed was non-final, it was later replaced 
with revised judgments on both dockets that ended the 
litigation on the merits for all parties.  See Morton Int’l, Inc. 
v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470, 476 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that a decision is “final” under § 1291 when all 
claims against all parties have been resolved).  Within thirty 
days of the entry of the revised judgments, and at the request 
of the Clerk of our Court, Walters and Kromenhoek filed 
jurisdictional statements identifying these final judgments as 
the decisions to be challenged on appeal. 
 
The simplest route to finding jurisdiction and defining 
its scope is thus through Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992), 
under which we may consider a document to be the 
equivalent of a notice of appeal so long as it meets the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) and 
is filed within the time limits of Federal Rule of Appellate 
                                                                                                     
precedent, we do not refer to counsel in the caption as 
“representing” Felice or Harcourt.  Giles v. Campbell, 698 
F.3d 153, 158 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bass v. Attardi, 868 
F.2d 45, 50 n.12 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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Procedure 4(a).  See id. at 248-49; In re FMC Corp. 
Packaging Sys. Div., 208 F.3d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(treating petition for mandamus that satisfied Rule 3 as notice 
of appeal “provided that it was filed, as it was, within the 30-
day limit set by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)”); see also Benn v. 
First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(emphasizing liberal construction of Rule 3); Intel Corp. v. 
Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1993) (treating 
opening brief as amended notice of appeal that extended 
appellate jurisdiction over post-judgment attorney’s fees 
order).  The jurisdictional responses were both timely under 
Rule 4 and appropriately fashioned under Rule 3.  We thus 
have jurisdiction over the appeal extending to all of the 
Appellees.8  
 
III 
 
 We exercise plenary review over the question whether 
a Fair Housing Act claim survives the death of a party, as this 
is an issue of law.  We also exercise plenary review over a 
grant of a motion for summary judgment.  Goldenstein v. 
Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016).  We 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party.  Id. at 146.  We will affirm if “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
 
IV 
 
                                              
8  Felice’s pending motion to dismiss the appeal is 
denied. 
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 The Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968 “to 
eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our 
Nation’s economy.”  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2521 
(2015).  The stated policy is “to provide, within constitutional 
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”  42 
U.S.C. § 3601.  In 1988, Congress extended the Fair Housing 
Act to protect against discrimination on the basis of disability.  
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 728 n.1 
(1995); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).  This was “a clear 
pronouncement of a national commitment to end the 
unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the 
American mainstream.”  Hovsons, Inc. v. Twp. of Brick, 89 
F.3d 1096, 1105 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis and citations 
omitted).  The Supreme Court has held that when construing 
the Fair Housing Act, “we are to give a ‘generous 
construction’ to the statute’s ‘broad and inclusive’ language.”  
Lakeside Resort Enters., LP v. Bd. of Supervisors of Palmyra 
Twp., 455 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Trafficante 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)).   
 
 These cases require us to address an issue of first 
impression—whether claims under the Fair Housing Act 
survive the death of a party.9  The Fair Housing Act is silent 
as to survival.  In the face of this interstice, the District Court 
                                              
 9  The issue of survival was paramount in Walters’ 
case and formed the basis for the District Court’s ruling 
against her.  However, we address the survival issue with 
respect to Walters and Kromenhoek, as both cases involve the 
deceased Appellees, Felice and Harcourt. 
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answered the survival question by applying a limited gap-
filler statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a), which in turn led the 
District Court to apply territorial law.  The District Court 
applied a Virgin Islands statute, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 77, 
under which it held that Walters’ Fair Housing Act claims did 
not survive her death.10   
 We disagree with the District Court’s decision to apply 
Section 1988(a) and, in turn, territorial law.  For the reasons 
below, we conclude that Section 1988(a) does not apply to the 
issue of whether a Fair Housing Act claim survives the death 
of a party.  Rather, we apply a uniform rule of federal 
common law.  We will reverse the judgment of the District 
Court dismissing Walters’ case due to her death.      
 
A 
 
 Section 1988(a) of Title 42 provides: 
 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters 
conferred on the district courts by the 
provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised 
Statutes for the protection of all persons in the 
United States in their civil rights, and for their 
vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in 
conformity with the laws of the United States, 
                                              
 10  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 77 states, in relevant part: 
“A thing in action arising out of a wrong which results in 
physical injury to the person or out of a statute imposing 
liability for such injury shall not abate by reason of the death 
of the wrongdoer or any other person liable for damages for 
such injury, nor by reason of the death of the person injured 
or of any other person who owns any such thing in action.” 
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so far as such laws are suitable to carry the 
same into effect; but in all cases where they are 
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the 
provisions necessary to furnish suitable 
remedies and punish offenses against law, the 
common law, as modified and changed by the 
constitution and statutes of the State wherein 
the court having jurisdiction of such civil or 
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, shall be extended to and 
govern the said courts in the trial and 
disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a 
criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment 
on the party found guilty. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2016) (emphasis added).11   
                                              
 11  Section 1988(a) is published at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a), 
which is only “prima facie” evidence of the law, as Title 42 
has not been enacted into positive law.  1 U.S.C. § 204(a).  
The authoritative text is Section 722 of the Revised Statutes 
of 1874, which is positive law.  U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. 
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 449, 449 n.4 
(1993).  The texts are substantively the same, and so is our 
analysis. 
 
 The slight difference between the two texts consists of 
how they refer to three Titles of the Revised Statutes.  Section 
1988(a) refers to them by number and Section 722 of the 
Revised Statutes, by name. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) 
(2016) (“titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes . . . .”), 
with R.S. § 722 (“this Title [The Judiciary], and of Title 
19 
 
 
 Section 1988(a) provides that where certain federal 
laws “are deficient” the federal courts may apply “common 
law, as modified and changed by the constitutions and 
statutes of the State,” provided that the state law is “not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”  42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).  For the reasons below, Section 
1988(a) does not apply to the Fair Housing Act.   
 
 
1 
 
 Our holding is based on the text of Section 1988(a).  
On its face, the statute applies to certain statutes—those 
found within three Titles of the Revised Statutes, “titles 13, 
24, and 70.”  42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).  If the Fair Housing Act 
had been contained within one of these three Titles, it would 
fall within Section 1988(a).  Of course, the Fair Housing Act 
was enacted almost a century after the Revised Statutes.  It 
was never codified in its Titles 13, 24 or 70.  Trafficante, 409 
U.S. at 365 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968)).  Therefore, Section 1988(a) by its 
plain meaning does not apply to the Fair Housing Act.  Cf. 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 n.11 (1980) (observing that 
“Section 1988 does not in terms apply to Bivens [v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971)] actions . . . .”).   
 
                                                                                                     
‘Civil Rights,’ and of Title ‘Crimes’”).  The alteration is an 
editorial decision by the publishers of the United States Code, 
as we explain in more detail below. 
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 Cowpet concedes this point, but urges us to ignore the 
plain text of the statute.  For the reasons below, we will not 
do so.   
 
2 
 
 Our text-based conclusion that Section 1988(a) does 
not apply to the Fair Housing Act is consistent with the 
legislative history, which shows that Section 1988(a) has 
always applied to designated statutes only.  Section 1988(a) 
has never applied globally to any statute that could be 
labelled a “civil rights” law.    
 
 Section 1988(a) was enacted as Section 3 of the Civil 
Rights Act of April 9, 1866.  Moor v. Cty. of Alameda, 411 
U.S. 693, 704 (1973) (citing Civil Rights Act of April 9, 
1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 
U.S.C. § 1988(a))).  It was “intended to do nothing more than 
to explain the source of law to be applied in actions brought 
to enforce the substantive provisions of the [same] Act, 
including [Section] 1.”  Moor, 411 U.S. at 705.  Those 
substantive provisions later became 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 
and 1982.  CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 
448 (2008) (citation omitted).  
 
 In 1870 and 1871, Congress “directed . . . that § 1988 
would guide courts in the enforcement of” particular statutes, 
which later became 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.  Moor, 411 
U.S. at 705 n.19 (citing Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 
16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981) 
and Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). 
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   Finally, in the Revised Statutes of 1874, Congress 
made Section 1988 more “generally applicable” to three 
specified Titles of the Revised Statutes.  Moor, 411 U.S. at 
705 n.19.  Those three Titles are “this Title [The Judiciary], 
and of Title ‘Civil Rights,’ and of Title ‘Crimes.’”  R.S. 
§ 722.  Of these three, Title “Civil Rights” contains the 
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, including what are 
now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1983.  42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(original version at R.S. § 1977); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (original 
version at R.S. § 1978); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (original version at 
R.S. § 1979). 
 
 Here the amendments end.  Congress has never again 
amended the phrase “this Title [The Judiciary], and of Title 
‘Civil Rights,’ and of Title ‘Crimes.’”  R.S. § 722.  As a 
result, Section 1988(a) continues to apply only those laws 
codified within these three Titles, Titles 13, 24 and 70, of the 
Revised Statutes of 1874.12 
                                              
 12  The text of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(a), has changed.  The editors of the United States 
Code have used different phrases, always to refer to the same 
three Titles of the Revised Statutes.  The current phrase, “the 
provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes,” 
first appeared in 1988.  42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).  Prior to 
that, the editors used these three phrases: (i) “of this Title, and 
of Title ‘CIVIL RIGHTS,’ and of Title ‘CRIMES,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 (1982) and (1976); (ii) “this chapter and Title 18,” 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970), (1964), (1958) and 8 U.S.C. § 49a 
(Supp. II 1948); and (iii) “chapter 3 of Title 8, and Title 18,” 
28 U.S.C. § 729 (1940), (1934) and (1926).   
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 We conclude that these are editorial changes for two 
reasons.  First, the changes were not made by congressional 
amendment.  Cf.  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 4(d), 114 Stat. 
804 (2000); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-317, Title III, § 309(b), 110 Stat. 3847 (1996); 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, § 40303, 108 Stat. 1796 
(1994); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 103-141, § 4(a), 107 Stat. 1488 (1993); Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I, §§ 103, 113(a), 105 
Stat. 1071 (1991); Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 
Title II, § 205(c), 94 Stat. 2321 (1980); Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 
§ 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).  Second, the editorial notes, which 
accompany each version of the statute since 1940, 
consistently refer back to the Revised Statutes.   
 
 Changes “made by a codifier without the approval of 
Congress” are “given no weight.”  United States v. Welden, 
377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964).  However, the changes do shed 
light on a prior decision of this Court.  In Miller v. 
Apartments & Homes of New Jersey, Inc., we applied Section 
1988, as the editors published it in 1970.  646 F.2d 101, 105 
(3d Cir. 1981).  At that time, the published version of Section 
1988 purported to apply to claims under “this chapter.”  Id. at 
105 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(1970).  This Court applied Section 1988(a) to housing 
discrimination claims, but without considering the textual 
issue addressed here—that the Fair Housing Act does not fall 
within the Revised Statutes, Titles 13, 24 and 70.  We give 
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 Congress’ inaction with regard to Section 1988(a) 
stands in contrast to its frequent amendment of Section 
1988(b), which relates to attorney’s fees.  Congress enacted 
Section 1988(b) in 1976 and then amended it repeatedly to 
provide for attorney’s fees in cases under “sections 1981, 
1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX . . ., 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 . . . , the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
. . . , title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . , or section 
13981 of this title . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2016).  See, 
e.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 4(d), 114 Stat. 803 (2000); 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, § 40303, 108 Stat. 1796 
(1994); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 103-141, § 4(a), 107 Stat. 1488 (1993); Civil Rights 
Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 
90 Stat. 2641 (1976).  In short, Congress has repeatedly 
amended Section 1988(b), but not Section 1988(a).  This 
supports our holding that Congress intentionally applied 
Section 1988(a) only to Titles 13, 24 and 70 of the Revised 
Statutes.  Cf. Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 169-70 
(1988) (considering repeated amendments as evidence of 
Congressional intent).   
 
3 
 
 Our decision is consistent with prior decisions 
interpreting Section 1988(a).  The Supreme Court has applied 
Section 1988 to determine survival of a claim under Section 
                                                                                                     
Miller little weight as to the applicability of Section 1988(a) 
to the Fair Housing Act. 
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1983, a Reconstruction-era law.  Robertson v. Wegman, 
436 U.S. 584, 589 (1979) (citing Moor, 411 U.S. at 702 n.14).  
It does not follow that Section 1988 also applies to the Fair 
Housing Act.  The Supreme Court has, in general, “rejected 
linkage” between the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Acts, 
e.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, and “other 
federal statutes, emphasizing the independence of the 
remedial scheme established by the Reconstruction-Era 
Acts.”  Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 49 (1984) (citations 
omitted).  For example, there are “vast differences” between 
Section 1982 and the Fair Housing Act.  Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 416-17 (1968).  See also Fleming v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 27 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding 
Section 1988 inapplicable to claims under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 
Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Fin. Corp., 615 F.2d 407, 
414 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding Section 1988 inapplicable to a 
claim under the Truth in Lending Act), overruled on other 
grounds by Pridegon v. Gates Credit Union, 638 F.2d 182, 
194 (7th Cir. 1982); but see Slade v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
952 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding in a cursory 
decision that Section 1988 applies to Title VII claim). 
 
 For all of these reasons, we will follow the plain text 
of Section 1988(a), under which Section 1988(a) does not 
apply to the Fair Housing Act.  We must turn elsewhere to 
determine whether a Fair Housing Act claim survives the 
death of a party.   
    
B 
 
 A Fair Housing Act claim is a federal statute, and 
therefore whether a claim survives the death of a party “is a 
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question of federal law.”  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23; see also 
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 
(1979).  As Congress has not provided statutory guidance, we 
resolve the survival issue according to federal common law.  
7C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1954 (3d ed. 2016); 6-25 Jerry E. Smith, 
Moore’s Federal Practice § 25.11 (2016).  However, this 
does not resolve the matter.  The “more difficult” question is 
not whether federal common law applies, but what its 
“content” should be.  Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727.  
Specifically, we must determine whether to apply a uniform 
rule of federal common law or adopt state law.  Id. at 728.   
 
 “Developing a federal common law rule is the 
exception rather than the rule.”  In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 
997 F.2d 1039, 1055 (3d Cir. 1993).  In general, “[a]bsent a 
demonstrated need for a federal rule of decision, the Court 
has taken ‘the prudent course’ of ‘adopt[ing] the readymade 
body of state law as the federal rule of decision until 
Congress strikes a different accommodation.’”  Am. Elec. 
Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 422 (2011) 
(quoting Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740). 
 
 But while “the term and concept of ‘federal common 
law’ may strike some as anathema to federal court 
jurisprudence in the wake of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 [] (1938), . . . in some areas of the law . . . so-
called ‘federal common law’ still exists to provide direction.”  
Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 837 F.3d 356, 365 n.11 (3d Cir. 
2016) (citations omitted).  One area where courts consistently 
apply a uniform rule of federal common law is survival of a 
federal claim.  See 7C Federal Practice and Procedure, supra 
§ 1954; 19 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra § 4516; 
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Moore’s Federal Practice, supra § 25.11.  Indeed, numerous 
cases have applied a uniform federal rule to the issue of 
survival.  See Figueroa v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
715 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (survival of claim under 
the Vaccine Act); Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 279 
F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2002) (survival of an ERISA claim); 
United States v. Land, Winston Cty., 221 F.3d 1194, 1197 
(11th Cir. 2000) (survival of forfeiture claim under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1955); Sinito v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 512, 513 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (survival of claim under the Freedom of 
Information Act); United States v. NEC Corp., 11 F.3d 136, 
137 (11th Cir. 1993), as amended, 11 F.3d 136 (1994) 
(survival of qui tam action under the False Claims Act); Smith 
v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 832, 834 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(survival of claim under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act); Mallick v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 
F.2d 674, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (survival of a claim under the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959); 
James v. Home Constr. Co. of Mobile, Inc., 621 F.2d 727, 729 
(5th Cir. 1980) (survival of claim under Truth in Lending 
Act).   
 
 We find these decisions persuasive.  Whether a Fair 
Housing Act claim survives the death of a party is an issue 
where a uniform federal common law rule is appropriate to 
fulfill the “overall purposes” of the statute.  Wallach, 837 
F.3d at 366 (quoting Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 438 (3d Cir. 
1993) (Greenberg, J., concurring and speaking for the 
majority)).  The federal interest at stake in the Fair Housing 
Act, “to provide . . . for fair housing throughout the United 
States,” 42 U.S.C. § 3601, “warrants displacement of state 
law” on the “confined” issue of survival.  Empire 
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Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 692 
(2006).  Thus, we will apply a uniform rule. 
 
 As to the content of a uniform federal rule, we are 
cognizant that we lack the “creative power akin to that vested 
in Congress.”  Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 422; see also 
Wallach, 837 F.3d at 369 (adopting as uniform common law 
rule set forth in the Restatement of Contracts).  For this 
reason, we will follow the weight of authority, which applies 
the pre-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins common law rule of 
survival, under which remedial claims survive, but penal 
claims do not.  See Moore’s Federal Practice, supra § 25.11; 
Ex parte Schreiber, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884) (penal claims do 
not survive).  We are persuaded by the numerous cases that 
have applied this rule.  See, e.g., Harrow, 279 F.3d at 248 
(ERISA claim remedial); Land, Winston Cty., 221 F.3d at 
1198 (forfeiture claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 remedial); 
NEC Corp., 11 F.3d at 137 (qui tam action under the False 
Claims Act remedial); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 
F.2d 859, 876 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that if federal law 
applies, Title VII is remedial, but declining to decide whether 
federal law applies); James, 621 F.2d at 730 (Truth in 
Lending Act remedial).13 
 
 A Fair Housing Act claim is remedial.  As we have 
stated, “[t]he Fair Housing Act was intended by Congress to 
have ‘broad remedial intent.’”  Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 
419, 425 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Havens Realty v. Coleman, 
455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982)); see also Mt. Holly Gardens 
                                              
 13  Our decision today applies only to survival under 
the Fair Housing Act.  We do not consider whether a pre-Erie 
rule of survival would be appropriate as to any other statute. 
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Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 
385 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The FHA is a broadly remedial 
statute . . . .”), cert. dismissed, 134 S.Ct. 636 (2013).  Thus, 
under the common law rule, Fair Housing Act claims survive 
the death of a party. 
 
V 
 
 We now reach the merits of the first of two Fair 
Housing Act claims—whether Cowpet refused to provide a 
reasonable accommodation for Walters and Kromenhoek’s 
disabilities, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(B).  We find that there are genuine issues of 
material fact.  Therefore, we will reverse the grant of 
summary judgment for Cowpet. 
 
 
A 
 
 The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful “[t]o 
discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of 
services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, 
because of a handicap.”  42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2).  
“[D]iscrimination includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable 
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, 
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such 
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”  42 
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).  To determine whether an 
accommodation is “reasonable,” we consider “whether the 
requested accommodation is ‘(1) reasonable and (2) necessary 
to (3) afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use 
and enjoy housing.’”  Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of 
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Adjustment of the Twp. of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 457 
(3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).    
  
 A reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing 
Act may include the use of an emotional support animal in 
one’s own home, despite the existence of a rule, policy or law 
prohibiting such an animal.  See, e.g., Castillo Condo. Ass’n 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 821 F.3d 92, 100 (1st 
Cir. 2016); Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 363 
(6th Cir. 2015); Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 
Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014).  In emotional 
support animal cases, a housing provider may contest whether 
the accommodation is reasonable.  Cowpet does not.  There is 
no dispute that Walters and Kromenhoek are disabled and that 
the use of an emotional support animal was reasonable and 
necessary for their enjoyment of their homes.   
 Rather, what Cowpet does dispute is the additional 
statutory requirement that there be a “refusal” to provide the 
reasonable accommodation.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).  To 
this requirement, we now turn.   
 
 Whether there has been a “refusal” to provide a 
reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act 
depends on the circumstances.  As several of our sister 
Circuits have held, a refusal may be “actual or constructive.”  
Groome Res. Ltd. v. Par. of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 199 (5th 
Cir. 2000); accord Austin v. Town of Farmington, 826 F.3d 
622, 629 (2d Cir. 2016); Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1286.  An 
undue delay in granting a reasonable accommodation may 
amount to a refusal.  Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1286; Astralis 
Condo. Ass’n v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 620 
F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2010); Groome Res. Ltd., 234 F.3d at 
199.  Moreover, a refusal “occurs when the disabled resident 
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is first denied a reasonable accommodation, irrespective of 
the remedies granted in subsequent proceedings.”  Groome 
Res. Ltd., 234 F.3d at 199 (quoting Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. 
Howard Cty., 124 F.3d 597, 602 (4th Cir. 1997)).   
 
 However, we note that the same action, e.g. a denial, 
may sometimes amount to a “refusal” and, at other times, 
mere enforcement of a housing rule.  For a housing provider’s 
action to be considered a “refusal” under the Fair Housing 
Act, the provider must have had a prior “opportunity to 
accommodate.”  Taylor v. Harbour Pointe Homeowners 
Ass’n, 690 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Tsombanidis v. 
W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 578 (2d Cir. 2003), 
superseded by regulation on other grounds, 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500(c) (2016), as recognized in Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 617 (2d Cir. 2016)).  “The 
defendants must have had an idea of what accommodation 
[the plaintiff] sought prior to their incurring liability for” 
refusing it.  Id. (citing Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 579).  For 
example, a housing provider may have an opportunity to 
accommodate because a plaintiff petitions for an 
accommodation or declares that she is entitled to it.  See, e.g., 
Castillo, 821 F.3d at 95, 98 (resident requested an 
accommodation by providing a doctor’s note and advising 
housing provider “that he planned to keep his emotional 
support dog in his condominium unit and that he was entitled 
to do so under federal law”).  In other circumstances, the 
disability and need for accommodation may be known or 
obvious to the provider.  Cf. Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (considering such a 
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situation in the context of the ADA).  These examples are 
non-exhaustive.14 
B 
 
 Cowpet contends that it did not “refuse” a reasonable 
accommodation because Walters and Kromenhoek were 
never deprived of their emotional support animals.  This 
argument fails.  Cowpet did not have to deny Walters and 
Kromenhoek their emotional support animals in order to 
“refuse” a reasonable accommodation.  As a matter of law, 
Cowpet may have refused a reasonable accommodation by 
declaring Walters and Kromenhoek in violation of the “no 
dogs” rule, by fining them fifty dollars a day or through 
                                              
 14  Herein, we describe the “refusal” element of a Fair 
Housing Act claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).  We do 
not adopt the position of the Eleventh Circuit, which 
recognizes a freestanding “request” element.  See Hunt v. 
Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1225 (11th Cir. 2016); 
Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1285; but see Schwarz v. City of 
Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1218 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(failing to list “request” as an element).  We decline to follow 
the Eleventh Circuit’s approach because it is a “refusal,” not a 
“request” that is required by the text of Section 3604(f)(3)(B).   
 
 Even so, the substantive result may be the same.  This 
is because the Eleventh Circuit has defined “request” to 
include any circumstances “sufficient to cause a reasonable 
[housing provider] to make appropriate inquiries about the 
possible need for an accommodation.”  Hunt, 814 F.3d at 
1226 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  We agree with 
this broad interpretation, but do not take the same route to get 
there. 
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undue delay.  Cf. Astralis, 620 F.3d at 69 (refusal occurred 
where condominium association cited residents for parking 
infractions).   
 
 Whether Cowpet’s actions constituted a “refusal,” 
however, depends upon whether Cowpet was given an 
opportunity to accommodate.  On this issue, the parties 
dispute material issues of fact.  There are two disputes of fact 
that preclude summary judgment.  
 
 First, the parties dispute whether Walters and 
Kromenhoek barred Cowpet from reviewing their paperwork.  
The basis for the dispute is a series of emails sent by Walters 
and Kromenhoek.  Although the content of the emails is 
undisputed, “there is a disagreement over the inferences that 
can be reasonably drawn from the facts . . . .”  Windsor Sec., 
Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Viewing the emails in the light most favorable to 
Walters and Kromenhoek, they are susceptible to two 
inferences.  On one hand, Walters and/or Kromenhoek may 
have barred Cowpet from reviewing their paperwork.  On the 
other hand, Walters and/or Kromenhoek may have only asked 
Cowpet to respect the privacy of their medical information.  If 
the factfinder concludes that the latter inference prevails—
that Cowpet was not barred from reviewing the paperwork—
then Cowpet had an opportunity to accommodate, which it 
“refused.”   
 
 Second, the parties dispute whether the Cowpet Board 
president, Harcourt, actually reviewed their paperwork on file 
in the Cowpet office.  The office manager, Schechter, avers 
that Harcourt did so; the Board treasurer, Koehler, avers that 
he did not.  If Harcourt reviewed the paperwork, then Cowpet 
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had an opportunity to accommodate, which it refused.  For 
both of these reasons, we will reverse the grant of summary 
judgment for Cowpet on Walters and Kromenhoek’s Fair 
Housing Act reasonable accommodation claims.   
 
VI 
 
 Walters and Kromenhoek also allege interference with 
the exercise of their fair housing rights, in violation of 
42 U.S.C. § 3617.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for Appellees.  We will reverse in part and vacate in 
part. 
 
A 
 
 Under the Fair Housing Act, “[i]t shall be unlawful to 
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in 
the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having 
exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected by 
section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 3617.   
 
 A Section 3617 claim does not require a substantive 
violation of Sections 3603-3606.  Hidden Village, LLC v. City 
of Lakewood, 734 F.3d 519, 528 (6th Cir. 2013); Bloch v. 
Fritschholz, 587 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc); 
United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 
1994).  A claim may arise before or, as here, after a plaintiff 
acquires housing.  Bloch, 587 F.3d at 782; see also Hidden 
Village, 734 F.3d at 529 (permitting post-acquisition Section 
3617 claim to proceed to trial).   
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 Walters and Kromenhoek’s cases involve one type of 
Section 3617 claim—alleged “interfere[nce]” with fair 
housing rights.  42 U.S.C. § 3617; see also 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.400(c)(2) (2016) (setting forth examples of unlawful 
conduct, including interference with “enjoyment of a 
dwelling”).  A Section 3617 interference claim requires proof 
of three elements: (1) that the plaintiff exercised or enjoyed15 
“any right granted or protected by” Sections 3603-3606; 
(2) that the defendant’s conduct constituted interference; and 
(3) a causal connection existed between the exercise or 
enjoyment of the right and the defendant’s conduct.  
42 U.S.C. § 3617; see also Quid Pro Quo and Hostile 
Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory 
Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 
63054, 63059 (Sept. 14, 2016). 
 
 The term “interference” is not defined by the Fair 
Housing Act or the implementing regulation, 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.400 (2016).  Therefore, the word must be “understood 
by its ordinary meaning.”  United States v. Piekarsky, 687 
F.3d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 2012).  The Ninth Circuit has 
construed “interference” for the purposes of Section 3617 
according to a dictionary definition as, “the act of meddling in 
or hampering an activity or process.”  Walker v. City of 
Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dict. 1178 (14th ed. 1961)); see 
also Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 
2003) (observing that Walker involved alleged retaliation).  
                                              
 15  In the alternative, Section 3617 prohibits 
discrimination on account of one “having aided or 
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of” 
fair housing rights.  42 U.S.C. § 3617.  
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Interference is “broadly applied to reach all practices which 
have the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights under 
the federal fair housing laws.”  Walker, 272 F.3d at 1129 
(citation omitted).  Interference does not require force or 
threat of force.  Id. at 1128 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3631).  Yet the 
prohibition on interference “cannot be so broad as to prohibit 
‘any action whatsoever tha[t] in any way hinders a member of 
a protected class.’”  Brown, 336 F.3d at 1192 (quoting 
Michigan Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 
347 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
 
 Interference under Section 3617 may consist of 
harassment, provided that it is “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive” as to create a hostile environment.  Quigley v. 
Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Honce v. 
Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993) (same).  Numerous 
decisions of our sister Circuits have recognized such a cause 
of action in the housing context.  See Neudecker v. Boisclair 
Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003); Bloch, 587 F.3d at 
783; Quigley, 598 F.3d at 946; Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 
487, 491 (7th Cir. 1997); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 
1008 (7th Cir. 1996); Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090.  Harassment that 
intrudes upon the “well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the 
home” is considered particularly invasive.  Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (citation omitted).16 
                                              
 16  Our interpretation is based upon the text of Section 
3617 and the decisions of our sister Circuits.  After we heard 
oral argument, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development issued a regulation, providing that Section 3617 
(Section 818 of the Fair Housing Act) may be violated by 
“hostile environmental harassment because of . . . handicap.”  
24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a) (2016).  No party brought this 
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regulation to our attention or asked this Court to rely upon it.  
Although this regulation is not necessary to our holding, it is 
fully consistent with our interpretation of Section 3617.  The 
regulation provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
Hostile environment harassment refers to 
unwelcome conduct that is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive as to interfere with: The availability, 
sale, rental, or use or enjoyment of a dwelling; 
the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or 
rental, or the provision or enjoyment of services 
or facilities in connection therewith; or the 
availability, terms, or conditions of a residential 
real estate-related transaction. Hostile 
environment harassment does not require a 
change in the economic benefits, terms, or 
conditions of the dwelling or housing-related 
services or facilities, or of the residential real-
estate transaction. 
 
(i) Totality of the circumstances. Whether 
hostile environment harassment exists depends 
upon the totality of the circumstances. 
 
(A) Factors to be considered to 
determine whether hostile 
environment harassment exists 
include, but are not limited to, the 
nature of the conduct, the context 
in which the incident(s) occurred, 
the severity, scope, frequency, 
duration, and location of the 
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conduct, and the relationships of 
the persons involved. 
 
(B) Neither psychological nor 
physical harm must be 
demonstrated to prove that a 
hostile environment exists. 
Evidence of psychological or 
physical harm may, however, be 
relevant in determining whether a 
hostile environment existed and, 
if so, the amount of damages to 
which an aggrieved person may 
be entitled. 
 
(C) Whether unwelcome conduct 
is sufficiently severe or pervasive 
as to create a hostile environment 
is evaluated from the perspective 
of a reasonable person in the 
aggrieved person’s position. . . . 
 
24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2) (2016).  The regulation further 
provides that “[h]arassment can be written, verbal, or other 
conduct, and does not require physical contact.”  24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.600(b) (2016).  In addition, “[a] single incident of 
harassment because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, national origin, or handicap may constitute a 
discriminatory housing practice, where the incident is 
sufficiently severe to create a hostile environment, or 
evidences a quid pro quo.”  24 C.F.R. § 100.600(c) (2016). 
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 Walters and Kromenhoek raised Section 3617 claims 
against four Appellees: Cowpet, Felice, Talkington and 
Harcourt.  We address each Appellee in turn.   
 
1 
 
 As to Cowpet, we previously explained that there is a 
material dispute as to whether Walters and Kromenhoek 
barred it from reviewing their accommodation requests.  We 
addressed this factual dispute in the context of Section 
3604(f)(3)(B).  We now address the same facts under an 
entirely different legal standard.  We conclude that the factual 
dispute is material to the Section 3617 interference claim.  If 
Walters and Kromenhoek barred Cowpet from reviewing 
their accommodation requests, then Cowpet did not 
“interfere” with their rights.  But if there was not such a ban, 
then Cowpet did “interfere” with their rights by failing to 
review their requests for a reasonable accommodation of their 
disabilities.  Thus, we will reverse the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Cowpet on the Section 3617 
claim.  
 
2 
 
 Walters and Kromenhoek allege that Felice, their 
neighbor, violated Section 3617 by posting derogatory, 
harassing and, at times, threatening comments on 
Talkington’s blog.  Felice wrote that dog owners might be 
“happier in another community rather than ostracized at 
[Cowpet], which would be another fine recourse, besides a 
significant $$ fine, with progressive amounts.”  App. 1905.  
He wrote that someone who needed an emotional support 
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animal “might go off his/her gourd” in a “violent reaction.  
We don’t even know we need protection![]  Bad Law![]”  
App. 1906-07.  He wrote “[i]f you can’t remove the guilty, 
you can certainly ostracize them.”  App. 1920.  He called dog 
owners “miscreants” and “totally selfish, spoiled, brats, 
willing to flaunt their illegality in every one[’]s face.”  App. 
1939.  He wrote that dog owners’ “gall and nerve require full 
responce [sic], with ostracizing the offenders in every manner 
at our disposal,” including “[i]solat[ing] them completely to 
their little ‘dog patch’ on the beach and ignor[ing] them at 
every venue or occasion![]”  Id.  He wrote that “failure to 
comply [with the no dogs rule] must lead to liens and even 
foreclosure, if needed, for compliance to be effective.”  Id.   
 
 Felice posted at least nine harassing messages, over a 
period of more than five months, from October 2011 through 
March 2012.17  All of these writings were made public on the 
Internet.  Felice continued his postings even after Walters 
responded, on the blog, that she was “mortified, that my 
personal business has been laid out over the internet without 
my permission or forewarning.”  App. 1912. 
 
 We conclude that there are genuine disputes of 
material fact “over the inferences that can be reasonably 
drawn from” Felice’s blog posts.  Windsor, 986 F.2d at 659.  
                                              
 17  Although Felice engaged in multiple instances of 
harassment, this is not necessary to a hostile environmental 
harassment claim under Section 3617.  A single act may be 
sufficient, provided that the conduct is “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive.”  Quigley, 598 F.3d at 946; see also Honce, 1 F.3d 
at 1090 (same).   
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A reasonable jury could find that Felice’s harassment was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive  as to “interfere” with Walters 
and Kromenhoek’s fair housing rights under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3617.  A reasonable jury could also infer that there was a 
causal connection—that Felice engaged in harassing conduct 
“on account of” Walters and Kromenhoek’s exercise of their 
fair housing rights.  Id.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
grant of summary judgment for Felice. 
 
3 
 
 Walters and Kromenhoek allege that Talkington, their 
neighbor, interfered with their fair housing rights by writing 
on his blog.18  Talkington named Walters and Kromenhoek 
and made public and derided their requests for 
accommodation of their disabilities.  He posted that 
“Barbara[] [Walters] has a dog and claims to have ‘papers’ 
that allow her to have it.”  App. 1904.  He wrote that Walters 
“has a pet and should be fined.”  App. 1910.  Talkington 
posted an email from Harcourt to both Walters and 
Kromenhoek stating that they were in violation of the “no 
dogs” rule.  Talkington wrote that Walters and Kromenhoek 
were “known violators” and that their emotional support 
animals were “illegal neighborhood puppy dogs.”  App. 1924.  
He wrote that Walters and Kromenhoek’s certifications for 
their emotional support animals were issued by disreputable 
websites without “verify[ing] either the animal’s credentials 
or the purported disability.”  App. 1930.  He suggested that 
Walters and Kromenhoek obtained their emotional support 
                                              
 18  Walters and Kromenhoek do not seek to hold 
Talkington liable for the posts of others, as they conceded in 
the District Court. 
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animal certifications from “diploma mill[s]” that would 
accept “stress” as a disability.  App. 1935.  Talkington wrote 
that Cowpet should “go on the offensive” and sue Walters 
and Kromenhoek.  App. 1938.  He explained that this would 
force them to “spend[] their own cash,” and “the rubber will 
meet the road on how far everyone is willing to go on this 
issue.”  App. 1941.   
 
 Overall, Talkington posted numerous harassing blog 
posts and comments over more than five months.  He posted 
these comments publicly on the Internet.  He continued to do 
so after Walters expressed her “mortifi[cation]” that her need 
for an emotional support animal was made public.  App. 
1912. 
 
 We hold that there are genuine disputes of fact over 
the inferences that can be drawn from Talkington’s blog 
posts.  Windsor, 986 F.2d at 659.  A reasonable jury could 
find that his conduct constituted harassment that was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to “interfere” with Walters 
and Kromenhoek’s fair housing rights.  42 U.S.C. § 3617.  A 
reasonable jury could also find that there was a causal 
connection between Talkington’s conduct and Walters and 
Kromenhoek’s exercise of their fair housing rights.  As such, 
we will reverse the grant of summary judgment for 
Talkington. 
 
4 
 
 Walters and Kromenhoek also alleged a Section 3617 
claim against Harcourt.  The District Court did not analyze 
this claim, but rather dismissed it on the ground that the claim 
was purportedly identical to the claim against Cowpet.  As we 
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reverse the Section 3617 claim against Cowpet, we will 
vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of Harcourt.  
On remand, the District Court must determine whether or not 
to substitute a party for Harcourt.  See infra Section VII.  If 
the District Court grants substitution, the Court may be called 
upon to readdress the Section 3617 claim in light of this 
opinion. 
 
VII 
 
 The final issue before us is whether to permit 
substitution for the deceased Appellees Felice and Harcourt.  
The issues pertaining to substitution were raised below but 
were not resolved due to the District Court’s rulings on the 
merits.  Thus, while we deny the pending motions to 
substitute filed on our docket, we ask the District Court to 
decide the matter of substitution on remand, in light of our 
ultimate disposition. 
 
VIII 
 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will reverse in part and 
vacate in part the judgment of the District Court.  We will 
reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Cowpet on 
both the Fair Housing Act reasonable accommodation and 
interference claims, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)(B) and 3617.  
We will reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Felice and Talkington on the interference claims, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3617.  We will vacate the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Harcourt on the interference claim, 42 U.S.C. § 3617, 
and remand to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  On remand, the District Court 
shall determine in the first instance whether to permit 
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substitution for Appellees Felice and Harcourt.  Since the 
federal claims are restored, the District Court’s Section 
1367(c) rationale for dismissing the territorial claims no 
longer applies; thus, we will reinstate the supplemental 
territorial claims against all Appellees.  Each of these rulings 
shall apply to both Walters and Kromenhoek. 
